Over the past week, Ghana has been gripped by one of its most significant financial controversies: the Attorney General’s decision to discontinue the legal case against Dr. Kwabena Duffour and other defendants in the Unibank collapse saga. The announcement, initially made through a brief statement from the AG’s office, ignited a storm of debate, prompting the AG to hold a press conference to provide further clarity. Evans Mensah, a seasoned journalist from JoyNews, has unpacked this complex decision, drawing on court documents, financial reports, and historical context to explain why the AG opted to settle rather than pursue the case further.
The Unibank case dates back to 2017-2018, a period when the bank faced allegations of financial mismanagement, leading to its collapse and the revocation of its license by the Bank of Ghana. However, as Mensah’s investigations reveal, the facts surrounding the case have been muddled over time, with shifting financial figures and legal questions complicating the narrative. This article explores Mensah’s insights into the AG’s reasoning, tracing the case’s background, the confusion over amounts, the government’s role, legal challenges, and the eventual settlement, while reflecting on the broader implications for Ghana.
The Rise and Fall of Unibank
Unibank’s troubles began in 2018 when the BoG appointed KPMG as an administrator on May 31, 2018, to address allegations of liquidity and solvency issues, unmet payment obligations, and misuse of liquidity support. These claims pointed to mismanagement by the bank’s shareholders and directors, including Dr. Kwabena Duffour. The administrator’s initial report pegged Unibank’s liabilities at 4.97 billion Ghanaian cedis, a figure that soon rose to 5.7 billion cedis, becoming the widely cited amount in public discourse.
However, Mensah notes a critical detail: KPMG’s report included a disclaimer. “We have not sought to verify information or perform procedures necessary to express an audit opinion on any financial or non-financial information contained in this report,” the report stated. This caveat, Mensah argues, is the “genesis of the problem,” as it meant the initial figures were unverified and subject to change—a fact that would later undermine the case.
By August 1, 2018, the BoG revoked Unibank’s license and transferred its assets to the newly created Consolidated Bank Ghana (CBG). The administrator transitioned into a receiver, tasked with recovering funds and resolving the bank’s liabilities. Over the years, the financial picture shifted dramatically, culminating in a revised liability figure of 2.8 billion cedis in March 2024—a stark contrast to the earlier 5.7 billion.
A Tale of Shifting Numbers
The fluctuating figures in the Unibank case have been a central source of confusion. Mensah highlights how the initial 4.97 billion cedis, reported in May 2018, quickly jumped to 5.7 billion cedis without clear justification. “That is the amount that you heard a lot about. But that is not where it started,” he explains. The lack of verification in KPMG’s initial report raised questions about the reliability of these numbers.
It wasn’t until March 25, 2024, that the receiver, still the same entity as the original administrator, revised the liability down to 2.8 billion cedis. Mensah emphasizes this shift: “From 5 billion plus, the receiver in court just last year says he’s no longer interested in 5 billion because he’s now looked at the books and everything that happened at Unibank, and it is significantly less.” This reduction, based on a more thorough examination, exposed flaws in the original assessments and weakened the case against the shareholders.
The AG later referenced a negotiated figure of 3.3 billion cedis, but Mensah notes that this included 2.1 billion in “fictitious claims” and 300 million tied to a separate entity—amounts discounted from the final settlement. The changing numbers, he argues, reflect a process of verification that took years, casting doubt on the decisions made in 2018.
A Key Piece of the Puzzle
A pivotal aspect of the Unibank saga is the government’s substantial debt to the bank. Mensah points out that Unibank’s exposure to the government totaled 3.1 billion cedis, including:
- T-bills: 1.1 billion cedis
- Esla bonds: 131 million cedis
- Cash and short-term funds: 233 million cedis
- Unpaid guarantees and IPCs: 1.3 billion cedis
- Government-guaranteed loans: 457 million cedis
- Public institution loans: 446 million cedis
The shareholders argued that if these debts were repaid, the bank could have been saved. On June 5, 2018, they offered to inject 2 billion cedis—1 billion by mid-July and another by September—contingent on the government settling its obligations. Mensah underscores this commitment: “In two months, they would have put in 2 billion… to save the bank.”
Additionally, on June 22, 2018, the administrator notified the government of a specific debt of 868 million cedis, urging repayment to stabilize Unibank. The Ministry of Finance acknowledged this on July 12, promising validation, but the BoG revoked the license on August 1 before this process concluded. “If government had paid back part of this money, would the bank have survived?” Mensah asks, highlighting a missed opportunity.
Legal Challenges
The AG’s decision to discontinue the case was heavily influenced by legal uncertainties. Mensah notes that the shifting liability figures—from 5.7 billion to 2.8 billion—undermined the prosecution’s position. “If we pursue this matter further, we may not be in a position to win it,” the AG stated, reflecting doubts about the case’s viability.
A 2019 opinion by the previous AG, cited by Mensah, further complicated matters. It argued that the revocation of Unibank’s license and its transfer to CBG breached the law. “The revocation of a bank’s license or appointment of a receiver are not actions permitted under a report prepared pursuant to Section 114,” the opinion stated. Moreover, CBG was not licensed to operate on August 1, 2018, when it assumed Unibank’s assets—a potential criminal offense.
Mensah connects this to the current AG’s stance: “Once you see numbers changing as consistently as it has… you may not be on solid ground.” The legal risks, combined with the revised financial figures, made a court victory uncertain.
Settlement Negotiation
Faced with these challenges, the AG negotiated a settlement with the shareholders. They offered to pay 2 billion cedis in full and provide 800 million cedis in assets, totaling 2.8 billion cedis—matching the receiver’s revised liability. Mensah finds this alignment striking: “Although the AG may have negotiated this after the court, somehow, the figures are adding up.”
The settlement also includes plans to recover additional funds: 500 million cedis already retrieved and 700 million cedis expected over 18 months. Mensah praises the shareholders’ consistency: “In 2018, Unibank said they were ready to pay 2 billion in two months… In 2025, they’ve ended up same place. 2 billion in full.” He questions why this offer wasn’t accepted in 2018 to save the bank, noting the subsequent loss of jobs and livelihoods.
Implications and Lessons
The discontinuation of the Unibank case carries profound implications. It exposes the dangers of acting on unverified financial data, as seen in KPMG’s initial report, and the need for rigorous due diligence. The government’s unpaid debts highlight a systemic issue that could destabilize other financial institutions if unaddressed.
Legally, the case underscores the importance of adhering to proper procedures. The 2019 AG opinion suggests that the BoG’s actions in 2018 were hasty and potentially unlawful, a lesson for future regulatory interventions. The settlement, while pragmatic, raises questions about accountability and whether justice was fully served.
Mensah concludes with a call for reflection: “What are the lessons we can draw from this? We must learn for the future.” The Unibank saga, he argues, should prompt reforms in financial oversight, debt management, and legal compliance to prevent similar controversies.
