A Ghanaian citizen, Sophia Kokor, has filed an action at the Supreme Court seeking an order of the Court declaring as unconstitutional the practice whereby Security Agencies, which exercise police powers, impose outrageous bail conditions without the involvement of the Courts in Ghana.

The action comes on the back of recent harsh bail conditions imposed by institutions such as the Economic and Organized Crime Office (EOCO) and the Bureau of National Intelligence (BNI) on persons arrested and detained by the agencies.

Bail conditions imposed by EOCO and BNI have largely been determined on a case-by-case basis and have become increasingly strict in recent high-profile financial crime cases, mostly involving officials who served in the erstwhile Akufo-Addo administration.

To secure release, suspects generally must provide substantial financial bonds, often ranging from GHc10 to GHc150 million, and secure reputable public servants or business executives as sureties.

Suspects have largely been unable to meet the conditions, and their lawyers have had to file motions in the High Court to vary the bail conditions imposed by the arresting institution.

These bail conditions imposed by agencies exercising police powers have been criticized as unconstitutional and as a breach of the fundamental human rights of suspects, with calls to challenge the phenomenon in court.

The writ of summons filed on 20 May 2026 was signed by Bobby Banson, lawyer for the plaintiff (Sophia Kokor), and the Attorney General is named as the defendant. In all, the plaintiff is seeking ten reliefs from the Supreme Court.

First, the plaintiff is seeking “a declaration that on a true and proper interpretation of Article 14(1) (a,) (c) (g), Article 14 (3) and Article 19 (2) (c) of the 1992 Constitution, it is only a court of competent jurisdiction that can grant bail to a person on conditions set by the court, be it anticipatory bail or post-arrest bail.”

Second, “a declaration that on a true and proper interpretation of Article 14(1) (a,) (c) (g) Article 14 (3) and Article 19 (2) (c) of the 1992 Constitution, the right of a person to be released within 48 hours of arrest, unless brought before a court of competent jurisdiction is unequivocal and not subject to said person meeting conditions set by the arresting entity or person.”

Third, “a declaration that on a true and proper interpretation of Article 14 (1) (a) (c) (g). Article 14 (3) and Article 19 (2) (c) of the 1992 Constitution, no arresting body, including officers in a security agency in Ghana, has the authority to exercise discretion in determining the bail conditions of persons suspected of having committed or about to commit a crime.”

Fourth, “a declaration that on a true and proper interpretation of Article 14 (1) (a) (c) (g). Article 14 (3), Article 19 (2) (c) of the 1992 Constitution, the conduct of police or officers of security agencies setting bail conditions for persons invited in investigations, whether as suspects, persons of interest, or witnesses, is unconstitutional.

Fifth, “a declaration that on a true and proper interpretation of Article 296 (c) of the 1992 Constitution, an arresting officer of any security agency cannot exercise a discretion to set bail conditions in the absence of any Constitutional Instrument or Statutory Instrument that governs the exercise of such discretion to determine bail conditions.”

Sixth, “a declaration that on a true and proper interpretation of Article 19 (2) (c) read together with Article 14(3) in this digital age, the State agencies exercising police powers ought to use Video Recorded Interviews (VRI) to facilitate realization of the spirit of the 48-hour rule and to prevent conditions that conduce to custodial dealings with persons helping in investigations,”

Seventh, “a declaration that the provisions of section 15 (2) of the Criminal and Other Offences (Procedure) Act, 1960 (Act 30) are inconsistent with and contravene the spirit and letter of Article 14 (3) and Article 19 (2) (c) of the 1992 Constitution.”

Eight, “an order striking down the provisions of section 15 (2) of the Criminal and Other Offences (Procedure) Act, 1960 (Act 30) as being inconsistent with and contravening the spirit and letter of Article 14 (3) and Article 19 (2) (c) of the 1992 Constitution.”

Ninth, “an order directed at all officers exercising police powers to comply with the spirit of Article 19(2)(c) by indicating in their invitation to persons required in investigation whether they are invited as suspects, persons of interest, or witnesses to facilitate the procurement of anticipatory bail by any such person

Lastly, “an order of perpetual injunction restraining Security Agencies, including all persons exercising police powers, from setting bail conditions without the court’s involvement for persons brought within their custody in investigations, whether as suspects, as persons of interest, or as witnesses.”