A proposed second control centre for Ghana’s power transmission system would not have prevented the recentAkosombo substation fire, according to Ing Peter Antwi Boasiako, former deputy director of the Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) Service.

Speaking on the Asaase Breakfast Show on Friday (12 June), Antwi challenged one of the key recommendations emerging from the committee investigating the incident, arguing that the fault occurred outside the scope of any control room intervention.

“If the fault happens at the outlet before it joins the national power pool, no second control centre can prevent it,” he said.

Antwi explained that the incident stemmed from a cable failure within a trench, not at a joint or central control system.

“The cable bent within the trench and triggered the fault. This is not something a backup control room would have addressed,” he noted.

He added that the system’s existing protections functioned effectively in preventing a wider collapse.

According to Antwi, Ghana narrowly avoided a total system failure, despite the loss of between 800 and 900 megawatts from Akosombo.

“When two turbines went off, four were still running. The system operators were able to isolate Akosombo within about 30 minutes,” he said.

He explained that a sudden loss of generation could have triggered a cascading failure across other power enclaves such as Takoradi and Tema.

“They would have interpreted the surge in demand as a fault and shut down to protect themselves. That did not happen, and we must acknowledge that,” he added.

While rejecting the redundancy argument, Antwi agreed that maintenance lapses may have contributed to the incident.

“If there was overheating due to loose contacts, maintenance should have detected it,” he said.

Antwi also criticised initial suggestions that the fire may have been caused by sabotage, describing such claims as politically driven and unhelpful.

“This is a serious engineering issue. Bringing politics into it is why we struggle to develop,” he said.

He further disputed recommendations for conventional water sprinkler systems in control rooms, noting that such systems are unsuitable for electrical environments.

“Water and electricity are not compatible. Control rooms require gas-based suppression systems like SM200, not water sprinklers,” he explained.

He, however, endorsed the use of early smoke detection systems, which can trigger automatic shutdowns to prevent escalation.

Antwi urged authorities to focus on engineering solutions rather than costly but ineffective interventions, warning that misdirected investments could waste public funds.

“We must properly diagnose the system before recommending solutions,” he said.